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Abstract: 
 
Corporate governance is most often defined in terms of the roles, responsibilities, and 
interactions of top management and the board of directors. Using information on Macedonia, 
obtained through various sources, this study is an attempt on determining some of the factors that 
influence the development of governance and enterprise restructuring in this economy. 
 
This study is founded on governance-conduct-performance paradigm in strategic management. 
We will examine the possibilities that lead to the fallowing outcomes: A) The degree to which 
governance and enterprise restructuring is positively related to foreign direct investments, 
exports  and value added (industry and services) in Macedonian economy; B) The degree to 
which governance and enterprise restructuring is related to: listed domestic companies, market 
capitalization of listed companies and stocks traded, and presumably that relation is somewhat 
ambiguous, nonetheless important. 
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Introduction 
 
Corporate governance is most often defined ‘in terms of the roles, responsibilities, and 
interactions of top management and the board of directors’ (Thomas L. Wheelen & Hunger, 
2008). Using information on Macedonia, obtained through various sources, this study is an 
attempt on determining some of the factors that influence the development of governance and 
enterprise restructuring in this transition economy. 
 
In transition economies the processes of transformation are grave, much turbulent and thus our 
analysis will observe some of the factors that influence the development of governance and 
enterprise restructuring in Macedonia (Apostolov, 2011a). Consecutively, we will be interested 
to see weather corporate governance and enterprise restructuring, as defined by European Bank 
of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) through the indicator ‘governance and enterprise 
restructuring’(Apostolov, 2010a; Apostolov, 2010b, 2011b; EBRD, 1994-2009), has certain 
relations to some of the country’s performances and what these supposed relationships are in 
particular. 
 
This project is founded on governance-conduct-performance paradigm in strategic management 
(Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996; Hitt, Keats, & DeMarie, 1998; Iii & Waring, 1999). 
It examines the possibilities that lead to the fallowing outcomes:  
 
I. The degree to which governance and enterprise restructuring is positively related to 
foreign direct investments; 
II. The degree to which governance and enterprise restructuring is positively related to 
exports ; 
III. The degree to which governance and enterprise restructuring is ambiguously related 
to: listed domestic companies, market capitalization of listed companies and stocks 
traded; 
IV. The degree to which governance and enterprise restructuring is positively related to 
value added (industry and services). 
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Theoretical and literature framework  
 
 
As countries undergo serious system transformations the managers are faced with complex 
decision-making environment (Sanders & Mason, 1998), and thus it is closely regarded that the 
performance of large enterprises should be linked to managerial flexibility in making strategic 
decisions within the context of the firm’s governance. Furthermore, there aren’t many sources 
that can point towards emerging corporate governance mechanisms in South-East Europe, 
although prior research suggests that independent managers and board of directors (corporate 
governance) may be an important necessity for managerial ability to undertake performance-
enhancing strategies (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000).  
 
Before restructuring, the revenues were generated by monopolistic structure through a handful of 
specialized state-owned companies. As the reforms progressed towards free market economy in 
environment with sluggish internal demand, adopting better strategies may be closely linked to 
better financial performance of the firm (Luo & Peng, 1999). Moreover, we can see that previous 
research has linked strategies with performance (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Makhija, 2004), 
governance directly with performance (Djankov & Murrell, 2002; Peng, 2004), and consequently 
in this research we will make an essay to implement the governance-strategy-performance 
paradigm (Hitt et al., 1996; Iii & Waring, 1999). 
 
The introduced economic reforms in Southeast Europe (and also Macedonia) aimed at increasing 
enterprise efficiency and making the products internationally competitive, therefore reforms 
were tied to structural crisis (Uhlenbruck, Meyer, & Hitt, 2003). The pre-reform environment 
was characterized by import protection and export promotion through monopolistic, state-owned 
foreign trade companies, which in many terms crippled the enterprises to meet overseas threats 
and as a result made the internationalization of their work very difficult. 
 
As liberalization of the market forces and privatization progressed, they were meant to eliminate 
the constraints imposed on managers by state ownership and command economy system 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000; Makhija, 2004). In the case of the Southeast Europe, companies were 
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privatized using range of methods (Djankov & Murrell, 2002). Thus, the privatization process 
resulted with diverse range of ownership structures and corporate governance mechanisms 
(Newman, 2000). Through recent research has been found that performance and 
internationalization strategies depend and can be enhanced by bigger managerial independence, 
however it is clear that the second depends  of firm’s corporate governance, and in particular of 
the ownership structure and board composition (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Uhlenbruck et al., 2003).  
 
The corporate governance affects enterprises restructuring and financial performance (Hoskisson 
et al., 2000; Peng, 2004). Indeed, when firms from transition economies are involved in 
international activities, they are likely to develop their capabilities (Sanders & Mason, 1998), 
which implies a positive relationship between governance exports and financial performance 
(Luo & Peng, 1999).  
 
As a consequence of the peculiar characteristics of the capital market in Macedonia i.e. lack of 
developed capital markets, limited portfolio diversification and liquidity, it is often stated that 
large shareholders could wish to utilize potential upside of a particular business strategy, but they 
are frequently restrained and affected adversely by the company’s idiosyncratic risk1  (Maug, 
1998). Due to this phenomenon they chose to impose sub-optimal strategies on managers. 
Moreover, large shareholders in transition countries where the protection of minority investors is 
low, most often endeavor to take advantage of their power and grasp “private benefits of 
control”. This ‘expropriation’ can be found in a range of forms, such as ‘related party 
transactions, use of transfer pricing, assets stripping and other forms of “tunneling” of revenue 
and assets from firms’ (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997). Therefore, in such economies high ownership concentration 
was investors’ response to low levels of protection of minority shareholders in emerging markets 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
 
Even though we analyze and focus specifically on Macedonia, variations in governance regimes 
indicate sufficient international analyses of the links between governance and enterprise 
                                               
1 Another term for unsystematic risk. The variability in the returns of an investment as a result of factors specific to 
that investment only. 
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restructuring and other parameters of the national economy (La Porta et al., 2000; La Porta, 
Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Porta et 
al., 1997; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
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Figure I.1 Governance-Conduct-Performance paradigm 
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Analytical Framework 
 
1. Sample selection and Data 
 
This study is based on sources provided by the data bases of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (EBRD, 1994-2009), the World Bank Database2, the 
National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia3 and the Macedonian Stock Exchange4, for the 
period of 1996-2008. 
  
Further, the World Bank Database is comprised of many sources gathered from:  Standard & 
Poor's and supplemental S&P data, World Bank national accounts data,  International Monetary 
Fund, International Financial Statistics and Balance of Payments databases, Global Development 
Finance, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, OECD GDP estimates, OECD National Accounts 
data files. 
 
The data sample of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) i.e.  
Transition Report publication series used in this research are taken from their index structure 
‘economic statistics and forecasts’ (EBRD, 1994-2009). The scale used in shaping the transition 
indicators ranges from 1 to 4+, ‘where 1 represents little or no change from a rigid centrally 
planned economy and 4+ represents the standards of an industrialized market economy’(EBRD, 
1994-2009). 
 
The data taken from the Macedonian Stock Exchanges and the National Bank of the Republic of 
Macedonia is relatively good and viable for research, as the institutional requirements are close 
to those in developed countries, as the European integration processes and the implementation of 
European Directives keep the standards constantly up to date. 
 
                                               
2  World Bank Database, Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/ 
3 National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia:  http://www nbrm.gov.mk/  
4  Macedonian Stock Exchange: http://www.mse.org mk/ 
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Figure I.2 Analytical  Framework 
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2. Model and Econometrics
 
The econometric model that is used in this study is a regression model where we have estimated 
the fallowing equation (Freedman, 2005; Gelman, 1996; Gilks, Richardson, & Spiegelhalter, 
1996): 
  
ipipio xxi   ...11    (1) 
ni ,...1    (2) 
 
 
Thus, applied to our research this model has the fallowing shape: 
titititititititioti SVAIVASTTVMCLCLDCEXPFDIGOV ,,7,6,5,4,3,2,1,  
(3) 
 
 where the dependent variable, tiGOV , , shows governance and enterprise restructuring;  
 
 the independent variables, are as follows :  
1. tiFDI ,  foreign direct investments;  
2. tiEXP ,  exports of goods and services  
3. tiLDC ,  
listed domestic companies, total 
4. tiMCLC ,  market capitalization of listed companies  
5. tiSTTV ,  stocks traded, total value  
6. tiIVA ,  industry, value added  
7. tiSVA ,  services, value added  
 
   is a p-dimensional parameter vector ;  
   is the error term or noise. 
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Figure I.3 Definition of variables 
Definition of variables 
dependent variable 
0. GOV - Governance and 
Enterprise restructuring 
Governance and Enterprise restructuring 
 
Effective corporate governance and corporate control exercised through domestic financial institutions and markets, 
fostering market-driven restructuring. The corporate governance is most often defined in terms of the roles, 
responsibilities, and interactions of top management and the board of directors. 
Source: EBRD  
 
independent variables 
1. FDI - Foreign direct investment, 
net inflows (BoP, current US$) 
FDI are Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) 
 
Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or 
more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity 
capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. 
This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign 
investors. Data are in current U.S. dollars.  
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and Balance of Payments databases, and World 
Bank, Global Development Finance. 
3. EXP - Exports of goods and 
services (% of GDP) 
Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the 
world.  
 
They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, 
such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. They 
exclude compensation of employees and investment income (formerly called factor services) and transfer payments.  
 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
4. LDC - Listed domestic 
companies, total 
 
Listed domestic companies, total 
 
Listed domestic companies are the domestically incorporated companies listed on the country's stock exchanges at the 
end of the year. This indicator does not include investment companies, mutual funds, or other collective investment 
vehicles.  
 
Source: Standard & Poor's, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook and supplemental S&P data. 
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Continuation  
independent variables 
5. MCLC - Market capitalization of 
listed companies (% of GDP)  
 
Market capitalization (also known as market value) is the share price times the number of shares outstanding.  
 
Listed domestic companies are the domestically incorporated companies listed on the country's stock exchanges at the 
end of the year. Listed companies does not include investment companies, mutual funds, or other collective 
investment vehicles.  
 
Source: Standard & Poor's, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook and supplemental S&P data, and World Bank and 
OECD GDP estimates. 
6. STTV - Stocks traded, total value 
(% of GDP) 
 
Stocks traded refers to the total value of shares traded during the period.  
 
This indicator complements the market capitalization ratio by showing whether market size is matched by trading.  
 
Source: Standard & Poor's, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook and supplemental S&P data, and World Bank and 
OECD GDP estimates. 
7. IVA – Industry, value added (% 
of GDP) 
Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes manufacturing (ISIC divisions 15-37).  
 
It comprises value added in mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate subgroup), construction, electricity, 
water, and gas. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate 
inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of 
natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC), revision 3.  
 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
8. SVA - Services, etc., value added 
(% of GDP) 
Services correspond to ISIC divisions 50-99 and they include value added in wholesale and retail trade (including 
hotels and restaurants), transport, and government, financial, professional, and personal services such as education, 
health care, and real estate services.  
 
Also included are imputed bank service charges, import duties, and any statistical discrepancies noted by national 
compilers as well as discrepancies arising from rescaling. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all 
outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The industrial origin of value added is determined by the 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3.  
 
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. 
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Results and Effects 
 
 
The study adopts variables that are compatible to governance-conduct-performance paradigm in 
strategic management (Hitt et al., 1996; Hitt et al., 1998; Iii & Waring, 1999), and using OLS 
regression gives answers to the posed hypotheses: 
 
1. The degree to which governance and enterprise restructuring is positively related to foreign 
direct investments 
 
The results of the OLS regression, depending on the model, show different significance (p < 
0.01, p < 0.05  and p < 0.1). This points out that there is evidence that governance and enterprise 
restructuring is positively related to foreign direct investments (FDI).  
The ownership structure of the companies that produce most of Macedonia’s domestic product is 
moving towards dominant participation of foreign direct investments, hence members of board 
that are foreigners which is important impact on the way corporate governance is conducted and 
its future prospects (IFC, 2007). 
2. The degree to which governance and enterprise restructuring is positively related to exports  
 
Exports (EXP) are very important component of country’s economy, as they represent the value 
of outputs that are compatible on international markets, thus exports stand for the core value of 
the economy. The models in this study show significance of p < 0.05 and p < 0.1, which can be 
taken as evidence in support to this hypothesis. 
This variable shows good and stabile results in different models always giving results that go in 
favor of the posed hypothesis. Hence, it is evident that governance and enterprise restructuring is 
positively related to exports, which is at length explained in the literature through many case 
studies and empirical examinations (Aulakh, Kotabe, & Teegen, 2000; Bernard & Bradford 
Jensen, 1999; Clerides, Lach, & Tybout, 1998). 
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Figure I.4 OLS on Macedonia 
OLS
Independ
ent 
Variable [1] [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] [6]  [7] [8]  [9]  [10]  [11]
FDI 0.0004198 0.0003968 0.0006149 0.0006066
[0.0003011]* [0.0002313]* [0.000185]*** [0.0002495]**
EXP 0.0128715 0.0138421 0.0120253 0.0026239 0.0221788 0.0187067
[0.0096059]* [0.0065788]* [0.0061497]* [0.001181]* [0.0072646]** [0.0066181]**
LDC 0.0023395 0.0021274 0.0028694 0.0021813 0.0032371 0.0030523 0.0030526
[0.0015107]* [0.0010159]* [0.000819]*** [0.0011321]* [0.0016764]* [0.0022172] [0.0014519]*
MCLC -0.0019121 -0.0003502 0.0070824 0.0030523
[0.0085776] [0.0095783] [0.0115265] [0.0083757]*
STTV 0.0102849 0.0442949 0.0631784 0.0080859
[0.047734] [0.0492703] [0.0598984] [0.0465195]
IVA 0.0452572 0.0458168 0.0875782 0.0725762 0.1047018 0.1716308 0.2256834 0.2110666
[0.0714842]* [0.0603836] [0.0681573] [0.0602511] [0.0553845]* [0.0583034]** [0.046851]*** [0.053674]***
SVA 0.0792699 0.0781704 0.1057383 0.1426811 0.148559 0.2023326 0.2560758 0.277355
[0.0753913]* [0.0638924] [0.074738] [0.0621923]** [0.0546022]** [0.065463]** [0.052214]*** [0.059340]***
Constant -4.288757 -4.270065 1.544574 -6.609103 -8.906548 -10.17887 -14.61289 2.041323 -19.24564 2.15636 -19.86619
[6.265517] [5.319115] [0.235429]*** [6.216735] [5.09977] [4.518894]* [5.330305]** [0.11047]*** [4.242581]*** [0.075419]*** [4.902935]***
Observatio
ns 104 78 52 65 52 91 78 52 52 39 39
R-squared 0.9276 0.9268 0.8947 0.8805 0.8478 0.896 0.8445 0.6274 0.7922 0.549 0.6902
Adj R-sqrd 0.8262 0.8745 0.8596 0.8208 0.7971 0.8441 0.7334 0.5032 0.723 0.4588 0.6282
Time 
period 
Significanc
e Level: *** p < 0.01  ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1
Dependent Variable
Governance and enterprise restructuring 
Macedonia
1996-2008
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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3. The degree to which governance and enterprise restructuring is ambiguously related to: listed 
domestic companies, market capitalization of listed companies and stocks traded 
 
The relation of governance and enterprise restructuring to the variables representing listed 
domestic companies, market capitalization of listed companies and stocks traded was tested and 
gave rather mixed results.  
 
The variable showing listed domestic companies (LDC) in almost all models showed 
significance (p < 0.01 or p < 0.1). Hence, it could be claimed that the increase and presence of 
domestic companies that are capable to fulfill the criteria to be listed on the Macedonian Stock 
Exchange is important attribute to governance and enterprise restructuring. 
 
As for the other two variables, market capitalization of listed companies (MCLC) and stocks 
traded (STTV) there aren’t significant outcomes. 
 
4. The degree to which governance and enterprise restructuring is positively related to value 
added (industry and services) 
 
The variables explaining value added in industry (IVA) and value added in services (SVA) were 
tested for a relationship with governance and enterprise restructuring.  
 
Further, the results on value added in industry (IVA) in most of the OLS regression models 
comport with decent significance (p < 0.01 or p < 0.5). Thus, this demonstrates a relation of 
value added in industry to overall governance and enterprise restructuring. 
 
As far as the variable explaining value added in services (SVA) is concerned, the outcomes and 
conduct is almost the same as IVA, even though the curve it gives is quite different from that of 
value added in industry. 
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Figure I.5 Variables’ movements in governance and enterprise restructuring 
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Continuation  
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Discussion  
 
 
The purpose of this analysis was to test four hypotheses, that is, the extent to which governance 
and enterprise restructuring is positively related to foreign direct investments, exports and value 
added (industry and services), as well as, the extent to which governance and enterprise 
restructuring is related to listed domestic companies, market capitalization of listed companies 
and stocks traded. Further, as a conceptual framework the study used governance-conduct-
performance paradigm in strategic management. 
 
Hence, the findings of the regression analysis point out that there is evidence to tie positive 
developments in governance and enterprise restructuring to foreign direct investments, exports 
and listed domestic companies. On the other hand, there is inconclusive evidence on market 
capitalization of listed companies and stocks traded to the extent of their impact on corporate 
governance and enterprise restructuring. Finally, there are significant results on value added in 
industry and services. 
 
This paper is a contribution to the research developing the business aspects of the Macedonian 
economy, as there is constant lack of scientific papers that deal with the specific issues of 
corporate governance and enterprise restructuring.  
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